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et al.: Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc. and W.D. Rubright Co. v. Interna

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
V. HIAB HYDRAULICS, INC., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa.
1973), and W. D. RUBRIGHT Co. V. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER Co.,

WALTERS

358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973):

CONTRIBUTION IN PRODUCTS

LIABILITY CASES.

In Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc.,' the court held that a
seller who is strictly liable for unreasonably dangerous defects in
his product' has a right to seek contribution from a party whose
liability for damages arises solely through negligence. In W.D.
Rubright Co. v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,' the court held that
the converse is also true-that a party whose liability arises solely
from negligence has a right to seek contribution from a manufac-

turer whose liability arises solely under theories of strict liability
for unreasonably dangerous defects in his product.

While the two cases appear to be concerned with opposite
sides of the same coin, in fact each one standing alone represents
the whole coin itself. This is because contribution, unlike indemnity, is a two-way street. To hold that a party who is strictly
liable has a right to seek contribution from a party who is negligently liable is also to hold that a negligent party can seek contribution from strict liability defendants. Once a court holds that a
right to contribution exists between different parties, either
party, once liable to the primary plaintiff, can seek contribution
from the other.4
Until these two cases, no right to contribution existed between negligent and strict liability parties in Pennsylvania, under
Fenton v. McCrory Corp.5 Both the Rubright and Walters courts,
therefore, effectively refused to adopt the Fenton ruling. However, while Walters admitted its holding was "[c]ontrary to the
court's prediction in Fenton .

..

,

Rubright merely mentioned

1. 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973).

2. For purposes of this discussion, a party who is strictly liable under Restatement
of Torts, Second, § 402A, is variously referred to herein as a "strict liability" party, or as
a "402A" party.
3. 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
4. "... [wlhere two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for
the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of
contribution among them .. " [emphasis added]. UNIFORM CONTBrIuioN AmONG
ToRTFEASORs Acr, § 1(a). Accord, Sayles v. Bates, 15 R.I. 342, 5A. 497 (1886).
5. 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
6. 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
7. 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1398-1399 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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Fenton as being in support of the contribution defendant,
International. 7 Rubright then proceeded to rest its decision upon
an unreported case, Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co.,' saying,
"We feel that Chamberlainsets forth the appropriate rule."I It is
possible that the Walters court found it easier to reach a result
contrary to that dictated by Fenton than did the Rubright court
in whose district Fenton was decided. And, despite the fact that
Rubright, in attempting to avoid the result dictated by Fenton,
said, "Chamberlain squarely addresses itself to the issue of
whether contribution should be allowed between a 402A tortfeasor and a negligence tortfeasor,"'' Chamberlainnever once mentioned Fenton.
Both courts, however, started their analyses with a consideration of Cage v. New York CentralR.R. Co. I Cage held that, in
Pennsylvania, under the Uniform ContributionAmong Joint
Tortfeasors Act,12 a wanton and willful tortfeasor has no right to
contribution against a negligent tortfeasor. Fenton interpreted
Cage to mean that no right to contribution can exist between
tortfeasors whose bases of liability differ. 13 That seems to be a
perversion of what was, under the facts in Cage, a defensible
treatment of contribution cases where one party is willful and the
other only negligent. Thus, while Rubright thought that Cage
"culminates in Fenton.. .",1" Walters viewed Fenton as an un5
justified "extension" of Cage:'
Federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have previously
concluded that Pennsylvania courts would hold that a tortfeasor
found guilty of wanton misconduct could not enforce a right of
contribution against one specifically found guilty of simply negligence in the same accident. . . .The Fenton court cited Cage
for the proposition that in Pennsylvania no right of contribution
exists between those whose liability is imposed on different
grounds and thus extended Cage.
8.Civil Action No. 68-1235 (W.D. Pa., May 19, 1972).
9. 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1400 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
10. Id. at 1399-1400.
11. 276 F. Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd per curiam 386 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1967).
12. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (1967).
13. "The history of the development of the doctrine of the right of contribution between joint tort-feasors in Pennsylvania, beginning with the judicial
declaration of such right in derogation of the common-law rule of no contribution and the adoption and subsequent interpretation of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act, . . .indicates to us that no such right exists
between those whose liability is imposed under different grounds. See Cage v.
New York Central R.R. Co. . .

."

47 F.R.D. 260, 262 (W.D. Pa. 1969).

14. 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
15. 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1001-1002 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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Although it is traditional that willful tortfeasors have no
rights to contribution as against merely negligent ones,"8 that
tradition does not supply the solution to the more recent problem
of what to do when one of the tortfeasors is liable under principles
of strict liability. That is the issue which confronted the Walters
and Rubright courts. Cage was reciting perfectly good law, since
contribution has never been available to intentional or wanton
tortfeasors.11 Fenton, on the other hand, treated strict liability
parties as if they were willful tortfeasors, barred from rights of
contribution. Fenton, however, relied on the different bases of
liability between the parties rather than on the nature of the tort
and did not discuss the degree of intent or willfulness characterizing the conduct of the § 402A party." Of course, the policy which
bars intentional or reckless tortfeasors from contribution is based
on the belief that courts should not aid parties guilty of such
conduct rather than because their liability differs in its theoretical basis from potential contribution defendants. 9
The inquiry in contribution suits involving strict liability
and negligent defendants should be directed at their liabilitycreating conduct, and not on the formal differences in the bases
of liability between the parties. The question should not be
whether the parties are liable on different grounds but, rather,
whether the grounds for liability are of such a nature that, analogizing to intentional or willful conduct, such parties do not deserve
judicial aid in the form of contribution rights.
Unfortunately, Rubright does not directly discuss the nature
of the conduct for which the contribution plaintiff is liable. Instead, it cites Chamberlain as holding that § 402A defendants
and negligent defendants are in pari delicto.2 The passage which
Rubright cites from Chamberlain actually claims, however, that
a § 402A party and a party liable "by virtue of the duty incurred
through the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
Safety Regulations,"' 2' are in pari delicto. On the face of it, this
16. Cage v. New York Central R.R. Co., 276 F. Supp. 778, 791 (W.D. Pa.), afl'd per
curiam, 386 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1967); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher, 292 Pa. 354, 141 A.
231, 232; Reath, Contribution between PersonsJointly Chargedfor Negligence, 12 HARv.
L. REv. 176, 182 (1898).
17. See note 16, supra.

18. See note 13, supra.
19. George's Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1942):
It is the unlawful intention to violate another's rights, or a willful ignorance and
disregard of those rights, which deprives a party of his legal remedy in such
cases.

20. 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1400 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
21. Id.
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might detract from the force of Chamberlain since it seems that
Chamberlain only compels holding 402A parties and negligence
per se parties in pari delicto. Inspection of the Chamberlaindecision, though, reveals that it refers to the contribution defendant
in that case as "a negligent employer" 22 and that the special
findings of the jury verdict in that case answered "yes" to the
question, "Was there any negligence on the part of the
[contribution defendant]?".

23

The basis of the Rubright decision

is that strict liability defendants are not guilty of intentional or
"quasi-intentional" conduct. The court states, "we do not believe that the principles set forth in Cage should be expanded to
bar contribution among joint tortfeasors responsible for nonintentional torts.

'25

Rubright, then, implies that the only bar to

contribution should be intentional or "quasi-intentional" conduct and that strict liability defendants are not guilty of such
acts.

26

While Rubright states that whatever strict liability is, it is
non-intentional, Walters goes a little bit farther in examining the
nature of the liability-creating conduct, implying that § 402A is,
at least in part, an evidentiary doctrine. Walters admits that a
§ 402A defendant may not be negligent, saying, "Indeed, a seller
may be liable . . . despite the fact that 'the seller has exercised
all possible care. .... , "27 But Walters later states, "The effect of
§ 402A is to relieve a plaintiff. . . from the burden of proving

that the manufacturer or seller was negligent ..
."25 What
Walters seems to say is that strict liability parties and negligent
parties have rights to contribution between themselves not only
because strict liability parties are non-intentional but, also, be22. Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., Civil Action No. 68-1235 at 3 (W.D. Pa., May
19, 1972).
23. Id. at 2.

24. We agree with the decision expressed in Cage to the effect that the
equitable principle of contribution should not be used to transfer part of the
obligation to pay compensation from a party that has acted quasi intentionally
so as to do a wanton and willfully negligent act to a party that was merely
negligent.
358 F. Supp. 1388, 1400 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
25. Id.
26. It should be pointed out, as Rubright did, that the defendant, International, in
Rubright, was found by the jury to be negligent aside from any liabilities under § 402A.
This, of course, detracts from the force of the discussion of contribution between § 402A
parties and negligent parties, in Rubright.
27. 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-1003 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 402A(2)(a)).

28. Id. at 1003.
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cause strict liability parties are probably negligent parties, anyway. All strict liability has done is to relieve the primary plaintiff
from the burden of proving negligence.
It is this view, that strict liability is either another name for
negligence or something very much akin to negligence, that seems
to underly much of Walters. The court states:
Prior to the adoption of § 402A, the plaintiff in most product liability cases brought in trespass was required to prove that
the manufacturer or seller was negligent in manufacturing or
selling the defective product. Because liability was based upon
negligence, the manufacturer had a right of contribution ...
Section 402A was adopted in order to afford greater protection
to a . . . consumer. . . . It does not follow that § 402A also
deprives the manufacturer or seller of his right to contribution
from a [negligent] third party. . ..
Walters ignores the possibility that pre-§ 402A practice may
have been altered by the very adoption of § 402A in Pennsylvania, in spite of its previous caveat that, unlike the situation
"[p]rior to the adoption of § 402A, ' ' 31 now, "[i]ndeed, a seller
may be liable . . . despite . . . 'all possible care . .. . ",31
Neither Walters nor Rubright offers a wholly satisfactory
approach. In rebuttal to Rubright, there may be good reasons to
deny a strict liability defendant judicial aid in the form of contribution, just as the courts now deny it to intentional tortfeasors.
The only reason Rubright offers to support rights of contribution
in favor of district liability parties is that such parties do not fit
into the traditional class of tortfeasors-the intentional
ones-now barred from contribution. Walters certainly demon29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1002-1003. The RESTATEMENT is quite clear that § 402A is not a negligence
concept:
This Section states a special rule applicable to sellers of products. The rule
is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or
consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of the product. The Section is inserted in the Chapter dealing with the
negligence liability of suppliers of chattels, for convenience of reference and
comparison with other Sections dealing with negligence. The rule stated here is
not exclusive, and does not preclude liability based upon the alternative ground
of negligence of the seller, where such negligence can be proved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment a (1965); and:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases
[with respect to contributory negligence] applies.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment n (1965).
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strates that the traditional reasons for denying contribution, as
exemplified by Cage, do not require denying it in cases of strict
liability parties; it effectively shows that Fenton was a needless
extension of Cage. But it is not necessarily sound to conclude on
such a basis that since contribution is not barred on traditional
grounds, it must therefore be granted. Nor is it sound to conclude
that contribution must be granted because strict liability may
sometimes serve as another name for negligence without evidence
of fault being required.
The problem that faces both Walters and Rubright is that of
the ghost of Fenton, speaking from the grave that both cases have
prepared for it. Fenton recognized that once the policy decision
has been made, in adopting § 402A, to hold manufacturers liable
for defective products, mainly because they are more adequately
able to distribute the risk of loss, it seems a step backward to
allow the manufacturer to search around for contribution defendants with whom he can share that risk. Such willingness to allow
manufacturers that kind of relief seems to circumvent the spirit,
if not the principle, of strict liability by avoiding a proper distribution of risk of loss. The reason Fenton was unable to satisfactorily resolve this issue, and the reason that both Walters and
Rubright are unable to exorcise themselves of Fenton's dilemma,
even after reaching the opposite conclusion, lies in the nature of
contribution itself.
Contribution lies somewhere between the all-or-nothing situation of indemnity, 32 and the supposedly equitable distribution of
liability in comparative fault jurisdiction.Y Indemnity works fine
when we are confident that one party should bear the risk of loss
whenever certain conditions are met.3 4 When dissatisfied with
32. See Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 311 Ky. 396, 224 S.W.2d 165 (1949).
But see, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972), in which it was held that the all-or-nothing aspect of indemnity can be avoided
by first "apportioning responsibility" and, then, awarding indemnification for that part
of the responsibility not borne by the party seeking reimbursement.
33. Such "comparative negligence" statutes offer a fairly simple problem
where only two parties are involved. Their administration is very much complicated when there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants. . . . Theoretically perfect as this procedure is, it may lead to almost incredible complexity in the
resulting issues, which may well be beyond the capacity of the ordinary American jury. ...
W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs, Ch. 11 § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
The case of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972), through its system of "apportioning responsibility" is a judicial attempt to
convert from a mechanism of indemnity and contribution to a comparative fault system.
34. There are two basic conditions, either of which will satisfy indemnity: where one
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such an approach, because it does not allow for any sharing of the
damages, a jurisdiction can adopt contribution. It is usually more
equitable to insist that all who cause the damage should share in
its compensation than to allow the plaintiff to sue the one defendant of his choice while other joint tortfeasors escape all liability.
While indemnity allows a defendant who is only "passively" liable to correct such a misplaced choice by a primary plaintiff,
indemnity places the burden on only a single defendant in the
end.
While contribution allows the damages to be shared equally
by all tortfeasors, it does, like indemnity, have some all-ornothing aspects, too. Since contribution is designed to mitigate
the evils of a situation where a plaintiff can choose the sole victim, it allows any party so chosen to seek contribution from the
others. Therefore, once we allow contribution in one direction, we
cannot disallow it in the other." It is this all-or-nothing (or, more
accurately, pro-rata-or-nothing)characteristic which troubled
the Fenton court.36 If behind § 402A there is a policy judgment
that manufacturers should bear the risk of loss,37 irrespective of
fault, then it is inconsistent to encourage them to search for forparty is clearly paying for another's wrong, or where one party is "actively" negligent, and
the other only "passively" so. This second condition is, obviously, difficult to determine.
See Ward v. McDan Dav Leasing Corp., 340 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Builders Supply
Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
35. See note 4 supra.
36. In fact, the only alternative Fentonoffered the defendant, who was seeking contribution from a negligent user, was indemnity, saying that barring contribution "did not
prejudice defendant in attempting to prove that the negligence of another party was the
sole proximate cause of the injury and damage." [Emphasis added.] 47 F.R.D. 260, 262
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
37. On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption,
has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the
consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained;
and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection
at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who
market the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment c.
That the manufacturer is to be the ultimate defendant in products liability cases,
irrespective of the fault of other parties which may have contributed to the damages, is
made quite clear by the fact that contributory negligence is not allowed as a defense. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment n, infra, note 51.
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tuitously situated contribution defendants with whom to share
that risk. It may be that negligent users and others are blameworthy and should pay damages, but contribution places them on an
equal footing with large manufacturers and distributors, forcing
them to share damages on a pro-rata basis. Once courts allow
negligent parties to seek contribution from strict liability manufacturers, the specter of countless manufacturers seeking to avoid
the results of § 402A liability by suing negligent parties such as
those in Walters-one of whom was an employer, the other, a
farm-owner on whose property the accident occurred-is inevitable. Those inescapable results are the product of the very concept
of contribution: a half-hearted attempt to apportion damages.
While going only half-way may appear unsatisfactory, proceeding any farther may be worse. The next step after contribution is even more difficult to apply in strict liability cases: comparative fault.38 City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales,
Inc. " is an example. It, like Walters, views strict liability, at least
in part, as an evidentiary aspect of what is, essentially, a case of
negligence," saying:
From the standpoint of the plaintiff, it is enough that,
under strict liability and without regard to the exercise of all
possible care, the seller, assembler and maker are held liable to
it for the defective construction of the wheel. However, as between multiple defendants, as to their right to contribution from
any one of the others, it is not enough.
City of Franklin claims that "each of the three [strict liability]
defendants is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. . . .'"' The
case also says that, "Where multiple defendants are involved in
a products liability case, it is also necessary to inquire, as was not
done here, into the comparative negligence of the individual defendants." 43 It concludes, "All are negligent as a matter of law as
38. "In some jurisdictions, however, either by express provision of statute or by interpretation of it, the distribution of the liability is in proportion to the comparative fault of
the defendants." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, Ch. 8 § 50 (4th ed. 1971); See also note 33
supra.
39. 58 Wis.2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
40. This is the rule, rather than the exception, in Wisconsin. It is due, in large part,
to the fact that Wisconsin is a comparative negligence jurisdiction. It should be noted
that, as a result, contributory negligence is part of the defendant's arsenal in that state.
See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
41. 56 Wis.2d 641, -, 207 N.W.2d 866, 871 (1973).
42. Id. at 872.
43. Id.
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to the plaintiff, but only such jury apportionment of comparative
negligence can provide the basis for contribution between
them.""
That kind of approach, obviously, supplies an instant solution to the issues presented in both Walters and Rubright. There
is some attraction, undoubtedly, in viewing strict liability as just
an evidentiary aspect of simple negligence. It provides a conventional measure by which to gauge or compare fault. Both Walters
and City of Franklinappear confortable dealing with strict liability as, essentially, negligence, so that it can be held to be in pari
delicto with negligence. That makes it easy to lump strict liability
and negligence defendants together for purposes of sharing
fault-as in contribution-or for comparing fault-as is done in
Wisconsin, a comparative fault jurisdiction."
The instant solution of City of Franklin, however, is not so
easy to administer. By labelling conduct negligence and requiring
the jury to so find it-for purposes of apportioning damages-the
court probably gives an impossible task to the jury. Despite what
City of Franklincalls it, and what Walters implies, § 402A makes
manufacturers and distributors liable even if "the seller has exercised all possible care. . . . "-4 If Walters and Rubright offer a
less-than-satisfying solution to the problem of contribution between strict liability and negligent defendants, City of Franklin,
by asking the jury to determine the "negligence" of parties who,
by definition, may not be negligent at all, supplies an answer
which is no more palatable.
There is no reason to suppose that City of Franklinis the only
alternative to Walters and Rubright. A jury is not limited by
considerations of reasonable care in its ability to apportion damages. The policy considerations underlying § 402A, some of which
are revealed in the accompanying comments, 47 can be utilized in
formulating a jury instruction. Ifthe writers of § 402A thought
parties should be liable despite "all possible care, ' 4 then so can
a jury. The reasons given by § 402A-protection of the consumer,
ability to distribute the risk of loss, considerations of warranty,
and the general public interest"9-can also be utilized by a jury
44. Id. at 873.
45. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(2)(a).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment c, supra note 37.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A(2)(a).
49. See note 37 supra.
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to apportion damages. They need not call it comparative negligence, nor, even comparative fault. If there are reasons to hold
manufacturers responsible for damages despite lack of "fault," it
can be called comparative responsibility. That is, in the end,
what the jury ultimately finds.
Going beyond Walters, Rubright and City of Franklin to a
system of "comparative responsibility" is not the sole alternative.
Even within the system of contribution with which Walters and
Rubright had to deal, there are options available. Throughout
this discussion, it has been assumed that contribution is a "twoway street," and that to grant rights of contribution to one tortfeasor among many requires the others to have similar rights
against that tortfeasor. It may be feasible to re-route some of that
traffic so that things become more rational. A few "one-way"
signs may make the road from contribution to comparative responsibility more orderly.
It is not unheard-of to bar certain parties from bringing suit
under certain conditions where, absent those conditions, they
would be free to seek judicial relief. For instance, a negligent
plaintiff may be barred from relief in those jurisdictions which
treat contributory negligence as a complete defense." Nevertheless, if that same party who would be barred from suing primarily
is, instead, sued as a primary defendant, he can then seek contribution from other tortfeasors who caused the damages. Thus,
negligence will bar primary relief but not contribution relief, even
though it is the same party about whom we are speaking. In other
words, contributory negligence is a "one-way" street, barring a
plaintiff when he is proceeding as a primary plaintiff in the direction of a primary defendant, but permitting suit (in fact, one
must always be liable before one can bring a suit for contribution)
when proceeding as a contribution plaintiff in the direction of a
contribution defendant. Moreover, in strict liability, being negligent will not create any liability in the plaintiff' (which is the
50. Except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff's
contributory negligence bars recovey against a defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained
by him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors, § 467; see W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRm, Ch. 11 § 65 (4th
ed. 1971).
51. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of
the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (See § 524) applies.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility
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but will create a liability when that party is sued as a contribution defendant.
What is suggested, then, is that it would not be without
2
precedent to hold that, for the reasons expressed in § 402A,
manufacturers should be liable as contribution defendants when
other parties have been chosen as primary defendants, but that
if the primary plaintiff makes a "correct" choice of defendant
initially-that is, by suing the manufacturer-the manufacturer
should not be permitted to circumvent the underlying policy of
3
§ 402A by seeking contribution from merely negligent parties.1
Under this theory, Rubright would have been correctly decided,
but Walters would have been incorrect.
It bears repeating that neither Walters nor Rubright examined the nature of the liability-creating conduct of a strict liability defendant. The error of both cases, if there was error, was in
concluding that since the contribution plaintiffs were not barred
under traditional standards, they must necessarily be granted
rights to contribution. The inquiry in contribution suits should
not be addressed to whether the parties fit the traditional class
which is denied contribution, but whether the same policy which
underlies denial of contribution in favor of willful tortfeasors is
advanced by denying contribution in these suits. That inquiry
can only be settled by an examination of the liability-creating
conduct.
The basis for denying contribution is that the contribution
plaintiff does not deserve the aid of a court. 4 It would appear that
jurisdictions, in adopting § 402A, have examined the nature of
the liability-creating conduct of manufacturers and distributors
and have decided that, in products liability cases, those parties
should be the ultimate defendants." As against a purely negligent
of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the
danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment n.
But see note 40, supra.
52. See note 37 supra.
53. The "partial indemnity" of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), represents a much more benign circumvention, if at all, of
§ 402A policy.
54. See note 19 supra.
55. See note 37 supra.
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defendant, then, a strict liability defendant does not necessarily
deserve the aid of a court in the form of contribution rights. The
policy of choosing manufacturers and distributors as the ultimate
defendants in products liability cases is not advanced by shifting
the burden to other non-strict-liability-defendants. While a
purely negligent party may merit rights to contribution, just as
any other negligent party does, that argument does not support
the same conclusion in favor of § 402A parties.
It may be argued that to insist that strict liability defendants
shoulder all the loss while other negligent parties get off scot-free
is unjust. 6 It seems more unjust, however, to insist that merely
negligent parties should bear a burden equal to that of manufacturers and distributors, who generally have larger resources, are
more able to adequately distribute the risk of loss, and, for the
reasons upon which § 402A is founded,- have been chosen as the
ultimate defendants in products liability situations. Until we
progress from contribution to a system of comparative responsibility, it would seem that justice requires an examination of the
possibility of barring manufacturers from rights of contribution
against merely negligent individuals.
Michael H. Davis
56. It should be remembered, however, that to allow a contributorily negligent plaintiff to shift the entire loss to the seller is no less unjust, and, yet, for the reasons listed in
the comments to § 402A, contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability. See
note 51 supra.
57. See note 37 supra.
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